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Bob Catley
^ p H E  E C O N O M IST’S ‘Foreign R eport’, confi- 
1 dential and never to be cited, is no doubt a 
great boon to academic commentators on foreign 
affairs; a useful short note on the latest activities 
in far-flung places, providing ample data for notes 
on current affairs. Its report on Vietnam, describ­
ing H anoi’s admission, via an editorial in  Nhan  
Dan of the failure of this year’s offensive was my 
first reintroduction to Western reporting on Indo­
china since my return from the DRV. W hile there, 
I had the opportunity to talk to the editor of Nhan  
Dan, and writer of the editorial, Mr. Hoang Tung; 
I also read the editorial. T he Vietnamese make 
no such admission. On the contrary, they regard 
the offensive as the latest in a series of strategic 
defeats which have been dealt to American policies 
in Indochina.
In the view of the DRV, the war in Indochina 
may be viewed as a war of resistance to American 
efforts to impose a neo-colonial government in 
Saigon. Each American strategy to achieve this ob­
jective has been defeated; each defeat has produced 
a new strategy, which has in turn  been defeated. 
At first, the French provided the means for US 
policy; they were forcibly evicted in 1954. A Saigon 
client regime was then organised, with Richard 
Nixon a m ajor architect. By 1961, this was on the 
verge of collapse and was only rescued by Ken­
nedy’s despatch of thousands of US m ilitary ad­
visers and the utilisation of ‘special war’ techniques. 
By 1964, this policy was in ruins both  m ilitarily — 
the NLF was recording impressive victories — and 
politically, with the series of coups which followed 
W ashington’s abandoning Diem. Johnson resorted 
to naked US force in the form of both  combat 
troops and aerial bombardment. T he T e t offensive 
of 1968 saw the denouement of both that strategy 
and its creator.
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In  1969, Nixon who, like all his predecessors, 
had been the peace candidate in the election cam­
paign, again reformulated American strategy in 
Indochina, bu t in  crucial respects his objectives re­
m ained the same. He made two crucial decisions, 
neither of which has been rescinded at the time 
of writing: to win the war — that is, to preserve an 
unpopular, client Saigon regime; and to win the 
1972 US elections despite winning the war. Again, 
like his predecessors, he had to do this in  the face 
of declining US capabilities in  Indochina. T he US 
army was inefficient, costly, politically expensive 
and facing severe morale problems. In  addition, 
US options were being reduced by the considerable 
erosion of its global supremacy, both economically, 
as international financial crises were to testify, and 
militarily, as the necessity to choose between com­
peting m ilitary demands in strategic weaponry, 
Europe and Indochina brought home.
T he means the N ixon Adm inistration adopted 
to implement US policy in Indochina were designed 
to overcome these problems. They are by now 
well known. T h e  Saigon forces were to replace 
the Americans and were suitably equipped for this 
purpose by large increases in US arms shipments. 
A stepped up “pacification” campaign, staffed by 
Saigon forces with US equipm ent, supervised by 
extensive, increased USAF bom bardm ent of rural 
Vietnam, backed by the herding of millions of re­
fugees into urban ghettoes and resettlement camps, 
and supplem ented by assassination programs 
against the “Viet Cong infrastructure”; these were 
its features. It was cheaper, less visible, and more 
destructive. T he 1969 campaign season witnessed 
its formulation, inauguration and political cam­
ouflage. In 1970, N ixon reim plem ented Johnson’s 
abortive -efforts to cut supplies to the South. Cam­
bodia was invaded in a farcical attem pt to locate 
the NLF command structure and the Cambodians 
joined the Indochinese resistance. In  1971, South­
ern Laos was invaded and Saigon’s crack forces 
beaten back in total defeat.
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In 1971, Nixon attem pted a more daring and 
original manoeuvre. H e opened personal contacts 
with both Peking and Moscow. T he Vietnamese 
and Chinese both viewed these initiatives as indica­
tions of N ixon’s weaknesses, arguing that had the 
US retained its supremacy of the 1950s, a US Pre­
sident would not have considered such personal 
diplomacy. They also appreciated that a subordin­
ate objective to the relaxation of inter-state tensions 
was an attem pt to persuade the Soviets, by offers of 
trade deals, and the Chinese, probably by sug­
gestions of technical assistance, to relax their sup­
port for Hanoi.
In  early 1972, many commentators, ranging from 
such anti-war veterans as Alex Carey, to the DLP, 
argued that Vietnamisation had succeeded and that 
the war in South Vietnam was all but won by the 
US. Diplomatically, the US had totally rejected the 
negotiating position of the Provisional Revolution­
ary Government of South Vietnam. T he PRG  had 
proposed in its 7-point program of July 1 1971 the 
establishment of a tripartite Saigon government of 
National Concord, one-third PRG, one-third urban 
opposition, one-third pro-US (minus Thieu), to 
supervise democratic elections in the South. Amer­
ican forces would withdraw on a tim etable that 
would also see the release of the PO W ’s from the 
DRV. South Vietnam would be non-communist, 
neutral and independent and then  negotiate with 
the DRV on the question of re unification. T he 
Americans utterly rejected this proposal by sup­
porting the farcical one-candidate presidential elec­
tions T hieu  organised and won with over 90 per 
cent of the vote in late 1971. Even McMahon ad­
m itted Australia did not consider it worthwhile 
to send observers. T he Americans were indeed con­
fident: the cost of the war was down, its destruc­
tiveness was up; only McGovern seemed likely to 
try to make it an election issue; victory seemed once 
more around the corner.
It is only in  this context that the objectives and 
achievements of the spring/sum m er offensive may 
be considered. It was a surprise. T h e  US thought 
an offensive of two or three divisions on one front 
might be possible; over 100,000 regular forces were 
deployed and four fronts opened. First, the ten 
year old defensive line south of the DMZ was 
smashed. Secondly, the outer defensive line north­
west of Saigon, centred on An Loc was attacked. 
Thirdly, the defensive line for central South Viet­
nam  around Kontum  was assaulted. These surprise 
offensives brought the deployment of Saigon’s reg­
ular strategic reserves. T he decisive front of irre­
gulars on the coast and in the Mekong delta was 
then opened in conjunction with intensified poli­
tical activities against T hieu in the cities.
T he m ain objective was never to seize territory 
for trading off in Paris, to capture a city and set up 
a government, or to conquer the whole of South 
Vietnam. As Mr. Hoang T ung  said, they cannot 
kick the Americans into the sea; they only have 
a small foot. T heir m ajor objectives were the 
American equipped, American trained, and Ameri­
can directed Saigon forces, and the American
created pacification campaign. They estimate to  
have severely damaged both.
Saigon’s regular forces have been fully deployed 
and severely m auled — three of their 13 regular 
divisions have been entirely destroyed and the re­
m ainder badly damaged. Pacification was then 
m anned by the even less well-motivated local forces 
that the irregular Liberation forces could engage. 
T he army of occupation was withdrawn to meet 
the offensive and revolution was again on the 
agenda. Phuoc T uy was one of its first successes. I t  
will take years to rebuild  ARVN and pacification.
In  this situation, the reaction of the U nited 
States became, as ever, critical. Clearly N ixon’s 
military interdiction policies had failed. Also 
clearly, despite the conjectures of W estern observ­
ers, particularly I. F. Stone in the New York Review  
of Books, and David Horowitz in  Ramparts. N ixon 
had failed to persuade Peking or Moscow to urge 
surrender on the Vietnamese. On the contrary, 
China seems more co-operative than before in  trans­
porting Soviet equipm ent and has just signed a 
new agreement on supplies with the DRV; Pod- 
gorny’s visit to Hanoi brought no relief to W ashing­
ton; and Kissinger brought no new crumbs from 
Peking in  June.
It should be pointed out that Peking’s reception 
for Nixon, while continuing its support for the 
Vietnamese, is contrary to neither its ideological 
posture nor its present strategic objectives. O n the 
first matter, the Chinese have clearly stated since 
at least the late 1950s that negotiations cannot be 
substituted  for force, and will not stop American 
ambitions. At present, in  their estimation, which 
may, of course, be disputed, the US is entering a 
strategic decline in  east Asia and it is this defeat 
which enables negotiations, not vice-versa. On the 
second point, they reason that the m ajor contem­
porary contradiction is between the people of the 
world and Soviet and US imperialism. Again, the 
normalisation of state-to-state relations with both 
is not incompatible w ith a policy of heightening 
that contradiction. W hether such views are valid 
may be debated; b u t they certainly do not neces­
sarily mean a “diplom atic sell-out” of the Vietnam­
ese, as sections of the W estern left have been quick 
to conclude.
As is well known, Nixon, like his predecessors, 
escalated ra ther than abandon Thieu. First, the 
blockade: will it work? T o  my untrained eye, 
H aiphong seemed shut, although the Vietnamese 
would not adm it it. In  view of US attacks on 
smaller vessels, they may well be correct. A CIA 
estimate of 1969, published in the New York 
Review of Books, Jurte 1 1972, gives detailed 
reasons why it would fail. T h e  blockade certainly 
hasn’t stopped the offensive.
Secondly, Nixon has increased the bombing of 
the DRV. I visited only the Hanoi-Haiphong area 
which is, by all accounts, less heavily h it than 
the southern provinces. W hile the US may well 
be attacking m ilitary targets, it is most certainly 
and deliberately h itting  non-military ones. I saw
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schools, hospitals and residential quarters that had 
been bombed. Villages have been attacked with 
fragmentation bombs, the most recent of which use 
plastic pellets that X-rays do not detect. Phuoc Loc 
village was attacked by B-52s at 2 a.m., April 16 
1972, and 444 people killed and 517 wounded. T he 
Red River dyke system, built over 1,000 years, and 
providing life for 15 million people, has been 
bombed deliberately and clouds seeded to  increase 
the destruction. “Spider” bombs, fragmentation 
bombs with eight 8-metre springs to attach them  
to buildings, trees or rubble, are dropped after 
raids to catch civilians emerging from the shelters. 
As enthusiastic American estimates of rising crime, 
prostitution and corruption in the DRV suggest, 
the m ain objective of the bombing is the social 
fabric and morale of the population, not its m ili­
tary capability which Johnson found invulnerable. 
But at present, American intentions to destroy 
totally the dyke system and break up  the social 
fabric of the DRV remain a threat; a threat which 
will be steadily implemented as the stick to en­
courage Vietnamese acceptance of a b itter carrot, 
the T hieu  regime and its cease-fire.
Thirdly, the Nixon Adm inistration has increased 
enormously the American fire power at its disposal. 
T he num ber of B-52s has been quadrupled to  over 
200; the num ber of tactical planes tripled to  over 
1200; the 7th fleet greatly strengthened. Perhaps 
200,000 U.S. servicemen remain engaged in  the war, 
only a quarter of whom are stationed in South 
Vietnam.*
Finally, N ixon offers the message to Hanoi; Mc­
Govern will not win. I will compromise now, but 
after the elections I will have no incentive to do 
so. You must compromise and accept my Saigon 
regime, and you must compromise now. If you 
don’t, I will win the election and you will be dead. 
T o  the world, N ixon’s message shows a different 
face. We are entering a period of peace and com­
promise, in Europe, in  the arms race, in  Korea, 
with China. Only the DRV remains obstinate. T h e  
American press even quotes, out of context, what 
appears to be Vietnamese criticisms of China for 
hosting the Nixon visit, suggesting that the Chinese 
would moderate but the DRV remains obstinate. 
A full reading of those texts makes clear that 
Hanoi condemned N ixon’s efforts to divide the 
socialist states bu t supported the normalisation of 
great power relations.
T he present state of the war now revolves around 
four m ajor questions: W ho holds the ground and 
has popular support?
I appreciate the disputes this question arouses.
I will only retail the view from Hanoi. T h e  rep­
resentatives of the Neo Lao Haksat claim control 
of four-fifths of Laos, despite eight tons of bombs 
per square kilometre per year being dropped on
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that area; 500,000 tons per annum  under Johnson, 
one million tons per annum  under Nixon; $250 of 
bombs per person per year, in  an area w ith an 
average per capita income of $60. Mr. Sinannen, 
the Cambodian Ambassador, estimated that Lon 
Nol was little more than “the mayor of Phnom 
Penh”, controlling Battambang, Phnom  Penh, Si- 
hanoukville, and a few smaller townships. Com­
munications between these centres is extremely 
limited and their economies to a large degree 
regulated by the surrounding forces. Mr. Soai, the 
PR G  representative claimed extensive control in 
four border provinces, along the coast and in  the 
Mekong delta. In  addition, he argued that the 
urban opposition opposed US policy, b u t was 
forced to operate legally in a situation of extreme 
repression. All three movements were adam ant 
that their local opponents were non-nationalistic, 
their m ajor weakness, and w ithout US support 
would collapse rapidly — Saigon in  15 days.
Can the DRV, backbone of the Indochinese Lib­
eration Movement, hold out? At every level from 
Foreign M inister to factory worker, from diplomat 
in China to hospital patient, determ ination and 
optimism were forcibly expressed. I could retail 
the concrete grounds for this, their effective air 
defences, their shelter system which minimises 
casualties, their well equipped air force and army, 
their cohesive, democratic social structure, bu t this 
would prove lengthy. Perhaps more impressive was 
their consciousness of their historic moment. In 
their view, their history was one of defeating inva­
sion, of creating a Vietnamese nation through two 
thousand years of struggle, of integrating them ­
selves and their culture to their environment, of 
creating a specific Vietnamese community. US 
policy of grafting an alien social and m aterial form 
on this fabric was painful and destructive, bu t 
would finally fail, if no t this year, in  1976 or 1-980 
o r . . .
Can the U nited States continue? M ilitarily and 
financially, Hanoi seems to accept that the US can 
continue its present policy for some time, bu t that 
it will encounter political pressures that will make 
the game not worth the candle. In  order to assess 
the strength of this view, it is necessary to ask 
what precisely are the stakes?
T he PRG has offered N ixon an olive branch in 
its seven-point proposal; its Paris delegation reports 
he still wants the whole tree. Mr. Hoang T ung  
argued that there is no fundam ental disagreement 
on the issues of a US withdrawal, the release of 
American POW s or a ceasefire. T h e  crucial ques­
tion is the character of the Saigon government. 
Only T hieu  is unacceptable to the PRG; perhaps 
only T hieu  will im plement US policy. Despite 
widespread treatises on the imperialist character 
of US policy, with which I am in sympathy, it 
still seems absurd that the US should expend over 
$100 billion, 50,000 lives, weaken its economy and 
alienate opinion throughout the world in order to 
m aintain a corrupt m ilitarist in  power.
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